First Nations Oppose Enbridge Pipeline Project

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Enbridge claims on equity agreements a sham, says Coastal First Nations

Vancouver (Tuesday, June 5) - A claim today by Enbridge that the company has signed equity agreements with 60 per cent of the First Nations along the proposed B.C./Alberta route of the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project is a complete sham, says Coastal First Nations executive director Art Sterritt.

"We have checked with all the First Nations on the pipeline route west of Prince George and only two First Nations have signed equity agreements," says Sterritt, in response to Enbridge's announcement earlier today. Sterritt says the numbers being bandied about by Enbridge are flawed.. "Enbridge expanded its pipeline corridor by 80 kilometers to increase its numbers. Many of these communities that have signed on are located outside of the areas that will be most impacted by a spill."

As well Enbridge is including groups that either aren't located on the pipeline corridor or don't have land in British Columbia, Sterritt said. "We are absolutely mystified about the inclusion of the Metis in Enbridge's 60 per cent. It's ridiculous to include groups that don't have Aboriginal Rights and Title to land within the pipeline corridor."

Despite Enbridge's comments to the contrary the Gitksan people have made it clear they don't support the project, Sterritt says . "They have strongly rejected the agreement."

The wall of opposition against Enbridge's proposed pipeline project still exists, he says. "We still intend to stop this project."

The Coastal First Nations is an alliance of First Nations that includes the Wuikinuxv, Heiltsuk, Kitasoo/Xaixais, Nuxalk, Gitga'at, Haisla, Metlakatla, Old Massett, Skidegate, and Council of the Haida Nation with approximately 20,000 members that are working together to develop a sustainable economy.

For more information:

Art Sterritt

Executive Director

Coastal First Nations

604-868-9110

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Vancouver (Tuesday, June 20, 2012)

British Columbians have every right to fear the tarsands pipelines after the third Alberta pipeline oil spill in a month, says Art Sterritt.

Sterritt, the executive director of the Coastal First Nations, says three oil spills of about quarter of a million litres each in Alberta is confirming our concerns. “At this rate we can expect to see 12 million litres a year of oil spilled.

Sean Kheraj, a York University professor of Canadian and environmental history, posted some of his findings on Alberta oil spills recently. His research showed that in 2010 alone pipelines in Alberta carrying either oil or some combination of oil, gas or distillates failed on average every 1.4 days and they spilled roughly 3.4 million litres of oil, Sterritt says. “This is not the path we choose for our future.”

This incident, along with the other two oil spills in the last month, is a grim reminder of the risks involved in pushing through the Northern Gateway Pipeline, he said. “It’s absurd for anyone to claim that the 230,000 litres of crude oil spill from Enbridge’s pumping station will not cause any environmental damage. What’s more absurd is Alberta’s premier claim that the 500,000 spill near the Red Deer River would not cause any environmental damage.”

Enbridge’s proposed Northern Gateway is a dangerous, short-sighted project that would make oil companies rich and leaves in its wake oil spills, environmental destruction and long-term economic damage to local communities, Sterritt said.

BC Premier Christy Clark is right when she says BC will take all the risks with few benefits of Enbridge’s proposed Northern Gateway Project, Sterritt says. “We need to see some bold leadership in BC. It’s time for the provincial government to step up and say no to this risky project.”

The Coastal First Nations is an alliance of First Nations that includes the Wuikinuxv, Heiltsuk, Kitasoo/Xaixais, Nuxalk, Gitga’at, Haisla, Metlakatla, Old Massett, Skidegate, and Council of the Haida Nation with approximately 20,000 members that are working together to develop a sustainable economy.

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For more information:

Art Sterritt

Executive Director

Coastal First Nations

604-868-9110

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Oil Spill Outbreak Strengthens First Nations' Opposition to Enbridge Pipeline

Also: First Nations accuse Harper government of putting interest of oil companies ahead of Aboriginal rights and the public interest by passing Bill C-38

NADLEH WHUT'EN, BRITISH COLUMBIA, Jun 22, 2012

The Yinka Dene Alliance, one of the leading First Nations opponents of the proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline, says that Enbridge's record of repeated oil spills demonstrates why the proposed project will never be permitted in their lands. The Alliance reacted to the news of yet another substantial Enbridge oil spill in Alberta this week, and the passage of Bill-C38.

"How can anybody in BC trust Enbridge's safety promises when they spill huge quantities of oil each year, all over North America?" said Chief Martin Louie of Nadleh Whut'en First Nation, a member of the YDA. "These spills are exactly what we are afraid of, and Enbridge keeps on proving that we can never accept their word on safety. No matter what effort they make, their proposed pipeline will put our kids in harm's way, so we say no way, and the public are standing with us. The string of bad spills throughout Alberta and beyond provides even more justification - as if we needed any - to say no to the Enbridge pipeline."

Two years after Enbridge's worst-ever oil spill disaster in Michigan's Kalamazoo river system, oil remains in the ecosystem and the river is only partially being reopened for recreational use this week. Chief Louie added: "Oil companies can talk all they want about their efforts to clean up oil spills, but the truth is that there is no such thing as oil spill cleanup. When oil spills into a river or onto a coastline, it can never be fully cleaned up. Local communities bear the brunt as the oil continues to infect the water and harm wildlife, plants and people. In Michigan, locals say that Enbridge didn't even give the local community the straight goods on what kind of oil had been spilled, and the potential health effects, for a long time."

Chief Louie also took aim at the federal government's weakening of environmental protections and bid to fast-track oil pipeline approvals, passed this week in the omnibus budget Bill C-38. The changes undeniably weaken the legal protection of First Nations fisheries by narrowing the range of fish that are defined as protected.

"The Harper government claims that these changes are being made in the 'national interest' but apparently that doesn't include aboriginal interests," said Chief Louie. "We are trying to overcome third world conditions while building our economies in a way that will sustain us for the long-term. An oil spill would destroy the land that our communities depend on, and that is unthinkable."

Chief Louie continued: "The Crown held a fancy meeting with First Nations chiefs in Ottawa this January, at which the Prime Minister and the Governor General promised renewed respect and strengthening trust. Next thing we know, Harper turns around and is doing whatever he can to put the interests of oil companies ahead of our constitutional rights, and the public interest. He's gutting Fisheries protections without even talking to our people who rely on the fish. Instead of involving First Nations and communities in decision-making, he's centralizing decisions on pipelines in his office. We are deeply disappointed, though not exactly surprised, that Harper's words to us are being shoveled onto to the heap of broken promises that harms the relationship between First Nations and Canada."

The Yinka Dene were joined for celebrations on National Aboriginal Day by their ally the National Chief of the Dene Nation and Regional Chief of the Assembly of First Nations for the Northwest Territories, Bill Erasmus. The Dene Nation continues to experience the effects of an Enbridge oil spill near Norman Wells, NWT, that happened last summer.

Chief Erasmus added: "We are sad for the people in Alberta, Michigan and elsewhere that have had to cope with Enbridge's oil spill disasters - we know what it's like. Our own Dene people in the NWT have suffered from an Enbridge oil spill last year that the company didn't even know about until our local people smelled the oil. We don't wish that fate on anybody else. We are standing with our sisters and brothers here in British Columbia and together we are going to put a stop to Enbridge's pipeline and tanker plans, and the unchecked tar sands expansion that will go with it."

Last month, the Yinka Dene Alliance travelled across Canada on the "Freedom Train" to take their refusal to approve Enbridge's Northern Gateway Pipeline directly to Enbridge's shareholders meeting in Toronto. The Yinka Dene Alliance is a coalition of five First Nations whose territories include more than 25% of Enbridge's proposed pipeline: Nadleh Whut'en, Nak'azdli, Takla Lake, Saik'uz and Wet'suwet'en.

Contacts:
Media Contact:
Chief Martin Louie
250-570-7759 (cell) or 250-690-7211
mlouie54@gmail.com

www.yinkadene.ca

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Turtle Island Native Network
http://www.turtleisland.org

Action camp in the path of the pipelines
Pipeline company to start clearing route this summer
http://unistotencamp.wordpress.com/

http://wildcoast.ca/caravan
Call to action: Indigenous people are asking for solidarity to stop the bulldozing of the Enbridge pipeline right-of-way in Northern BC. This summer, Pacific Trails Pipeline company is set to begin clearing hundreds of kilometers of forests, streams, and wetlands for its gas pipeline on the same route that Enbridge (and others) plan to follow. Clans in the Wet'suwet'en First Nation say NO. They are calling for support at Unis'tot'en Camp in the path of the pipelines.
http://unistotencamp.wordpress.com/

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First Nations among the more than 54 groups calling for an independent inquiry into pipeline Ssfety in Alberta

July 12, 2012
Redford faces mounting pressure for independent inquiry into pipeline safety

(Edmonton) Representatives of more than 50 provincial organizations today released an open letter calling on Premier Alison Redford to establish an independent inquiry into pipeline safety in Alberta. The organizations represent a broad cross-section of Alberta’s population, including farmer, landowner, labour, health, First Nations and environmental groups.

“The recent spate of pipeline spills has been a wake-up call for all Albertans,” said Don Bester, President of the Alberta Surface Rights Group. “We know that we have a problem with pipeline safety in this province, and we can’t afford to wait another year before starting to look at solutions or diagnosing the problem.”

The text of the open letter sent to the premier and opposition leaders reads:

Dear Premier Redford,

The recent series of major pipeline spills in the province has raised serious concerns for all Albertans about the integrity and oversight of the more than 300,000 kilometres of oil and gas pipelines that crisscross the province. These spills have brought attention to an issue that affects the entire province. Albertans deserve assurances that our pipeline infrastructure is safe, and that appropriate regulations and oversight are in place.

For this reason, we are calling on you to initiate an immediate independent province-wide review of pipeline safety in Alberta, similar to the one which was recently conducted for the Auditor General of Saskatchewan’s 2012 report.

We are encouraged that you have indicated you are “not opposed” to such a review, but we believe that such a critical issue simply cannot wait, as you have indicated, for the conclusion of the ERCB investigation into the recent spills. The average ERCB investigation takes nine months to complete, with some investigations taking years, and broader concerns related to regulation and enforcement are unlikely to be addressed by these investigations. An independent review of regulations and enforcement can and must be conducted in a parallel time frame to any ERCB investigation into individual spills.

Albertans need to know that their families, communities and drinking water are safe from pipeline spills. The time for leadership on pipeline safety is now, and the first step must be an independent pipeline safety review.

In 2011, the Energy Resources and Conservation Board (ERCB) exceeded its target for high-risk non-compliance incidents in provincial oil and gas infrastructure, including 155 pipeline infractions. In the same year, the ERCB inspected only five per cent of infrastructure in the province, relying on self-monitoring and reporting to ensure the integrity of the remaining 95 per cent. These recent incidents demonstrate that Albertans are right to question the safety of our pipeline infrastructure.

”We hope that the premier will move quickly to address the growing public concern over pipeline safety with an independent, province-wide review,” said Scott Harris, Prairies Regional Organizer with the Council of Canadians. “The time for a review is now, not after Albertans wake up to news of yet another pipeline spill.”

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For more information contact:

Scott Harris, Council of Canadians: 780-233-2528 (cell), 780-429-4500 (wk)

Don Bester, Alberta Surface Rights Group: 403-598-2178 (cell), 403-227-2178 (hm)

Signatories to the letter are:

Alberta Landowners Council
Alberta Surface Rights Group
Alberta Union of Provincial Employees
Alberta Wilderness Association
Alberta Workers’ Health Centre
Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation
Big Valley Surface Rights
Border Surface Rights
Butte Action Committee
Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment
Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society Northern Alberta Chapter
Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society Southern Alberta Chapter
Central Athabasca Stewardship Society
ChangeAlberta
Citizens for Responsible Development
Citizens for Responsible Power
Cleanwater Foundation
Confederacy of Treaty 6
Council of Canadians
Davey Lake Group
Dene Nation
Earth Alternatives
Edmonton Friends of the North Environmental Society
Environmental Defence
Friends of Lily Lake
Glasswaters Foundation
Greenpeace Canada
Indigenous Environmental Network
International Institute of Concern for Public Health
Keepers of the Athabasca
Lac Ste Anne Community Group
Lochend Under Siege Group
National Farmers Union
Nature Alberta
North Saskatchewan Riverkeepers
Onoway River Valley Conservation Association
Peace River Environmental Society
Pembina Institute
Powers Group
Public Interest Alberta
Regional Environmental Action Committee
Seniors’ Action and Liaison Team
Sierra Club Prairie Chapter
South Porcupine Stewardship Association
Springvale Surface Rights Association
Strawberry Landowners Group
Three Creeks Resident’s group
United Landowners of Alberta
United Nurses of Alberta
Uptag Society
Warburg Pembina Surface Rights Group
Water Matters
West Athabasca Watershed Bio Regional Society
World Wildlife Fund

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Turtle Island Native Network
http://www.turtleisland.org

Inadequacy of Enbridge's facility response plan. . . pervasive organizational failures. . .Deficient integrity management procedures. . .

July 28th, 2012

The Canadian government has informed Enbridge that it must allow officials to inspect its pipeline operations, in the wake of a U.S. report that was highly critical of Enbridge in connection with a major, destructive oil spill in Michigan.

Here's an excerpt from the Canadian government's letter to Enbridge this week. . .
"The National Energy Board (NEB) has reviewed the 10 July 2012 United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) synopsis report on an investigation of the Line 6B pipeline rupture near Marshall Michigan in July 2010. The report is critical of the Enbridge Integrity Management Program, the Control Room Management Plan and emergency response capabilities.

The NEB holds companies accountable for results in the public interest and will take all necessary actions to protect the environment and the public.
In this regard the NEB is notifying Enbridge that an inspection of its Edmonton Control Room as well as a meeting to assess implementation of relevant requirements of the Onshore Pipeline Regulations, 1999 (OPR) will occur on 8 and 9 August 2012. . ."

Here is a link to the letter from Canada's National Energey Board to Enbridge, informing the oil giant of what will happen. . .
http://www.scribd.com/doc/101329464/Can ... s-Enbridge

Here is a link to the U.S. government's report on the Enbridge spill in Michigan and how poorly that was handled by the oil company.
http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2012/PAR1201.pdf
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Pipeline Accident Report
Enbridge Incorporated Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Rupture and Release

Marshall, Michigan
July 25, 2010

NTSB Number: PAR-12-01
NTIS Number: PB2012-916501
Adopted: July 10, 2012
PDF
Executive Summary

On Sunday, July 25, 2010, at 5:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, a segment of a 30-inch-diameter pipeline (Line 6B), owned and operated by Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) ruptured in a wetland in Marshall, Michigan.

The rupture occurred during the last stages of a planned shutdown and was not discovered or addressed for over 17 hours. During the time lapse, Enbridge twice pumped additional oil (81 percent of the total release) into Line 6B during two startups; the total release was estimated to be 843,444 gallons of crude oil.

The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. Local residents self-evacuated from their houses, and the environment was negatively affected. Cleanup efforts continue as of the adoption date of this report, with continuing costs exceeding $767 million. About 320 people reported symptoms consistent with crude oil exposure. No fatalities were reported.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of the pipeline rupture was corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from crack and corrosion defects under disbonded polyethylene tape coating, producing a substantial crude oil release that went undetected by the control center for over 17 hours. The rupture and prolonged release were made possible by pervasive organizational failures at Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) that included the following:

Deficient integrity management procedures, which allowed well-documented crack defects in corroded areas to propagate until the pipeline failed.

Inadequate training of control center personnel, which allowed the rupture to remain undetected for 17 hours and through two startups of the pipeline.

Insufficient public awareness and education, which allowed the release to continue for nearly 14 hours after the first notification of an odor to local emergency response agencies.

Contributing to the accident was the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) weak regulation for assessing and repairing crack indications, as well as PHMSA's ineffective oversight of pipeline integrity management programs, control center procedures, and public awareness.

Contributing to the severity of the environmental consequences were (1) Enbridge's failure to identify and ensure the availability of well-trained emergency responders with sufficient response resources, (2) PHMSA's lack of regulatory guidance for pipeline facility response planning, and (3) PHMSA's limited oversight of pipeline emergency preparedness that led to the approval of a deficient facility response plan.

Safety issues identified during this accident investigation include the following:

The inadequacy of Enbridge's integrity management program to accurately assess and remediate crack defects. Enbridge's crack management program relied on a single in-line inspection technology to identify and estimate crack sizes. Enbridge used the resulting inspection reports to perform engineering assessments without accounting for uncertainties associated with the data, tool, or interactions between cracks and corrosion. A 2005 Enbridge engineering assessment and the company's criteria for excavation and repair showed that six crack-like defects ranging in length from 9.3 to 51.6 inches were left in the pipeline, unrepaired, until the July 2010 rupture.

The failure of Enbridge's control center staff to recognize abnormal conditions related to ruptures. Enbridge's leak detection and supervisory control and data acquisition systems generated alarms consistent with a ruptured pipeline on July 25 and July 26, 2010; however, the control center staff failed to recognize that the pipeline had ruptured until notified by an outside caller more than 17 hours later. During the July 25 shutdown, the control center staff attributed the alarms to the shutdown and interpreted them as indications of an incompletely filled pipeline (known as column separation). On July 26, the control center staff pumped additional oil into the rupture pipeline for about 1.5 hours during two startups. The control center staff received many more leak detection alarms and noted large differences between the amount of oil being pumped into the pipeline and the amount being delivered, but the staff continued to attribute these conditions to column separation. An Enbridge supervisor had granted the control center staff permission to start up the pipeline for a third time just before they were notified about the release.

The inadequacy of Enbridge's facility response plan to ensure adequate training of the first responders and sufficient emergency response resources allocated to respond to a worst-case release. The first responders to the oil spill were four Enbridge employees from a local pipeline maintenance shop in Marshall, Michigan. Their efforts were focused downstream along the Talmadge Creek rather than near the immediate area of the rupture. The first responders neglected to use the culverts along the Talmadge Creek as underflow dams to minimize the spread of oil, and they deployed booms unsuitable for the fast-flowing waters. Further, the oil spill response contractors, identified in Enbridge's facility response plan, were unable to immediately deploy to the rupture site and were over 10 hours away.

Inadequate regulatory requirements and oversight of crack defects in pipelines.

Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 195.452(h) fails to provide clear requirements for performing an engineering assessment and remediation of crack-like defects on a pipeline. In the absence of prescriptive regulatory requirements, Enbridge applied its own methodology and margins of safety. Enbridge chose to use a lower margin of safety for cracks than for corrosion when assessing crack defects. PHMSA expects pipeline operators to excavate all crack features; however, PHMSA did not issue any findings about the methods used by Enbridge in previous inspections.

Inadequate regulatory requirements for facility response plans under 49 CFR 194.115, which do not mandate the amount of resources or recovery capacity required for a worst-case discharge. In the absence of such requirements, Enbridge interpreted the level of oil response resources required under PHMSA's three-tier response time frame, resulting in a lack of adequate oil spill recovery equipment and resources in the early hours of the first response. By contrast, the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations specify effective daily response capability for each of the three tiers for oil spill response planning.

PHMSA's inadequate review and approval of Enbridge's facility response plan that failed to verify that the plan content was accurate and timely for an estimated worst-case discharge of 1,111,152 gallons. PHMSA's facility response program oversaw 450 facility response plans with 1.5 full-time employees, which is a lower staffing commitment than comparable response plan review programs carried out by the EPA and the Coast Guard. PHMSA and other Federal agencies receive funding from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to cover operational, personnel, enforcement, and other related program costs.

As a result of this investigation, the NTSB makes safety recommendations to the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, PHMSA, Enbridge, the American Petroleum Institute, the Pipeline Research Council International, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and the National Emergency Number Association. The NTSB also reiterates a previous recommendation to PHMSA.

Recommendations

New Recommendations

To the U.S. Secretary of Transportation:

Audit the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's onshore pipeline facility response plan program's business practices, including reviews of response plans and drill programs, and take appropriate action to correct deficiencies. (P-12-1)

Allocate sufficient resources as necessary to ensure that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's onshore pipeline facility response plan program meets all of the requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. (P-12-2)

To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:

Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452 to clearly state (1) when an engineering assessment of crack defects, including environmentally assisted cracks, must be performed; (2) the acceptable methods for performing these engineering assessments, including the assessment of cracks coinciding with corrosion with a safety factor that considers the uncertainties associated with sizing of crack defects; (3) criteria for determining when a probable crack defect in a pipeline segment must be excavated and time limits for completing those excavations; (4) pressure restriction limits for crack defects that are not excavated by the required date; and (5) acceptable methods for determining crack growth for any cracks allowed to remain in the pipe, including growth caused by fatigue, corrosion fatigue, or stress corrosion cracking as applicable. (P-12-3)

Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452(h)(2), the "discovery of condition," to require, in cases where a determination about pipeline threats has not been obtained within 180 days following the date of inspection, that pipeline operators notify the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and provide an expected date when adequate information will become available. (P-12-4)

Conduct a comprehensive inspection of Enbridge Incorporated's integrity management program after it is revised in accordance with Safety Recommendation P-12-11. (P-12-5)

Issue an advisory bulletin to all hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators describing the circumstances of the accident in Marshall, Michigan—including the deficiencies observed in Enbridge Incorporated's integrity management program—and ask them to take appropriate action to eliminate similar deficiencies. (P-12-6)

Provide additional training to first responders to ensure that they (1) are aware of the best response practices and the potential consequences of oil releases and (2) receive practical training in the use of appropriate oil-containment and -recovery methods for all potential environmental conditions in the response zones. (P-12-14)

Review and update your oil pipeline emergency response procedures and equipment resources to ensure that appropriate containment equipment and methods are available to respond to all environments and at all locations along the pipeline to minimize the spread of oil from a pipeline rupture. (P-12-15)

Update your facility response plan to identify adequate resources to respond to and mitigate a worst-case discharge for all weather conditions and for all your pipeline locations before the required resubmittal in 2015. (P-12-16)

To the American Petroleum Institute:

Facilitate the development of a safety management system standard specific to the pipeline industry that is similar in scope to your Recommended Practice 750, Management of Process Hazards. The development should follow established American National Standards Institute requirements for standard development. (P-12-17)

To the Pipeline Research Council International:

Conduct a review of various in-line inspection tools and technologies—including, but not limited to, tool tolerance, the probability of detection, and the probability of identification—and provide a model with detailed step-by-step procedures to pipeline operators for evaluating the effect of interacting corrosion and crack threats on the integrity of pipelines. (P-12-18)

To the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Emergency Number Association:

Inform your members about the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident and urge your members to aggressively and diligently gather from pipeline operators system-specific information about the pipeline systems in their communities and jurisdictions. (P-12-19)
Reiterated Recommendation

As a result of this accident investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board reiterates the following previously issued safety recommendation:

Require operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines and hazardous liquid pipelines to provide system-specific information about their pipeline systems to the emergency response agencies of the communities and jurisdictions in which those pipelines are located. This information should include pipe diameter, operating pressure, product transported, and potential impact radius. (P-11-8)

[admin]

Update as of 4:00 P.M. CDT Saturday, July 28, 2012

The safety of people and the protection of the environment are our highest priorities. Enbridge crews are working closely with local first responders and have made excellent progress with clean up and removal of the oil. Contaminated soils and trees are being removed from the site.

Enbridge is committed to the thorough restoration of the site as quickly as possible. Representatives from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources are on site. The cleanup will be conducted in compliance with all government regulations and Enbridge’s own stringent standards for safety and the environment.

With the progress of Enbridge’s response, the pipeline is now exposed for visual inspection. At this time, the cause of the release has not been determined but is being investigated. Repairs to Line 14 are expected to begin later today (Saturday, July 28).

We greatly appreciate the support we’ve received from local first responders and the cooperation and patience of the 2 affected landowners.

At this time, Enbridge does not have an estimated time for restart of the line. Enbridge safely returned Lines 6A and 61 to service early this morning. Line 13 will be restarted upon final confirmation that it was not affected by the release.

Enbridge Energy Partners, LP reported July 27 that a release of crude oil from Line 14 has been contained. The site is near Grand Marsh, Wisconsin.

At approximately 2:45 CDT, July 27, the Enbridge Pipelines Control Center detected a pressure drop on Line 14. Control Center operators shut down and immediately isolated the line. Enbridge emergency crews were promptly deployed to the site.

No one was injured. The oil has been contained on the west side of County Road G in a field, mostly on the pipeline right-of-way. The initial estimate of the volume released is approximately 1,200 barrels.

Enbridge has notified and is working with emergency officials and the appropriate regulators. The cause of the release has not been determined and is being investigated.

At this time, Enbridge does not have an estimated time for restart of the line.

Line 14 is a 24-inch, pipeline with capacity of 317,600 barrels per day, installed in 1998. It predominantly transports light crude oil to Chicago area refineries. It is part of the Partnership's Lakehead System and owned by Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, a subsidiary of the Partnership.

An image and quotes are available for use at http://www.enbridgeus.com/release-contained-on-line-14/

This message was sent by: Enbridge , 3000, 425 - 1 Street S.W., Calgary, AB T2P 3L8

[admin]

The Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, the Sea to Sands Conservation Alliance and the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs are campaigning British Columbians and Canadian citizens to oppose the Enbridge Northern Gateway Oil Pipeline project which will put our watersheds, lands and coastal watersheds at risk to imminent spills caused by faulty pipelines, human error and oil tankers running aground. For more information and to write letters or sign petitions visit http://www.carriersekani.ca

VIDEO: http://www.youtube.com/v/5aqaFH3afD4

http://www.youtube.com/v/5aqaFH3afD4

[admin]

Green Party of Canada
Submission to the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project Joint Review Panel

August 31st, 2012 in Blogs

As leader of the Green Party of Canada and as the Member of Parliament for Saanich-Gulf Islands, I appreciate this opportunity to place on the written record my comments on the Enbridge proposal for a 1177 kilometre long, twinned pipeline across northern British Columbia and a port at Kitimat to receive diluents and pipe it to Alberta, while piping back to Kitimat the mixture of diluents and bitumen. The proposal further involves the shipping of this mixture by super-tankers to be operated by persons unknown to, as yet undisclosed, ports.

Having observed the hearings and the evidence over the nearly eight months since the hearings began, I wish to make the following observations:

The proponent, Enbridge, has failed to provide any specific information about the impact of spills, on land or at sea, of the mixture it proposes to move by pipeline and sell to other carriers for shipment by sea. Bitumen and diluents were shown in the Kalamazoo Michigan spill to be considerably more difficult to remediate than conventional crude. The proponent has now admitted all its evidence was based on a substance it is not proposing to ship. Meanwhile, it should be noted that few improvements or technological advances on handling spills of conventional crude have been made since the Exxon Valdez spill.

The proponent has violated its social licence to operate through a culture of negligence. This failing is well-documented in the report of the United States National Transportation Safety Board (Enbridge Incorporated, Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Rupture and Release, Marshall Michigan, July 25, 2010, Accident Report NTSB/PAR-12/01, PB2012-916501, July 10, 2012). The spills and pipeline leaks in Kalamazoo, Michigan in 2010 and additional spill in the summer of 2012 in Wisconsin are ample evidence of the corporate culture of Enbridge being negligent. The panel is commended for accepting the report of the US. NTSB into evidence. As evidence before this panel, the litany of failures in preventing the Kalamazoo spill and subsequent negligence in ignoring alarms and pumping more bitumen-diluent mix into a broken pipeline must lead to a rejection of this proposal at this time.

The July 2012 report of the US NTSB is also relevant as it is clear that the Enbridge proposal was developed without any consideration of the experience of the serious spill in 2010 in Michigan. As such, the current proposal should be rejected and the proponent instructed to revise any proposal to take into account lessons learned in the 2010 failure.

The proponent has offered to this panel a mathematical risk estimate for spills in which the proponent deliberately chose to exclude local spill and accident events in the waters in which the proponent proposes to operate. This evidence of dramatically under-estimated risk of accident should be entirely discounted as fanciful and absurd. The review of this mathematical alchemy by the Raincoast Conservation Foundation should be accepted instead.

The need for the additional pipeline capacity has not been established. On this point, the evidence of J. David Hughes should be accepted that unless and until bitumen production increases by 150% from current levels, the existing pipeline infrastructure is adequate. (“The Northern Gateway Pipeline: An Affront to the Public Interest and Long Term Energy Security of Canadians,” November 22, 2011).

Transport Canada’s submission to this panel was reported in the media as establishing that there was no serious risk in super-tanker traffic. In fact, it did not say that at all. It merely said there were no “regulatory gaps.” In other words, it said, if there is a spill, we know which department will be in charge. In the entire Transport Canada review, there is no specific assessment of the particularly turbulent and navigationally challenging passages any super-tanker would encounter. The words “Hecate Strait” do not appear in the Transport Canada review, even though, Environment Canada’s Marine Weather Hazards Manual states that the Hecate Strait is “the fourth most dangerous body of water in the world.” The Transport Canada submission should not be used in evidence as relevant to the specific risks of the British Columbia coast.

No federal body nor the proponent have come forward with any credible analysis to lift the 1972 moratorium, honoured by every federal and British Columbia government since that time. It banned super-tanker traffic along the BC coastline, with the Port of Vancouver grandfathered. The federal government and the proponent would like to “pretend” the moratorium away. Admittedly, the moratorium was not enshrined in law, but its observance for four decades is a significant statement about its existence and importance. This panel has an obligation to consider Enbridge’s proposal as one that has the burden of proof to lift an existing moratorium.

The increased tanker traffic has been found to be a source of significantly increased risk to the endangered whales in the area. Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) review of threats to humpback whales in 2005 named the proposed tanker traffic to Kitimat as a threat to whale recovery. Humpback whales are listed as a species at risk in the threatened category. Scientists actually think the fin whales may be even more at risk of tanker collisions. Proposed mitigation measures of whale spotters on board tankers are mere “window dressing.” The notion that whale spotters can avoid collisions with endangered whales would only be plausible if super-tankers were prohibited from travelling at night, in dense fogs (typical in the area) or in storms and gales (also typical in the area).

First Nations constitutionally protected rights have not been honoured by the proponent. The proponent made false claims about the extent of its relationship with the Haida Nation, according to a letter sent to this panel by the President of the Council of the Haida Nation last year. The timelines and deadlines for this panel’s work will be unlikely to survive a court challenge under many precedents of the requirement for consultation and for the federal government’s fiduciary obligations to First Nations.

Dr. Jeffrey Hutchins of Dalhousie University has drawn attention to the fact that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was unable to provide the detailed scientific information this panel requires to make any judgement about the extent of damage to ecosystems and fisheries in the hundreds of stream and water crossings the pipeline will entail. It is outrageous that a government agency would conclude all damage can be mitigated when, by its own admission, it lacks the capacity, due to a loss of scientists and budget, to be capable of assessing the situation on the ground.

Recent budgetary cuts make this project even more risky due to a loss of capacity to respond to a spill. Environment Canada’s Environmental Emergency Programme has been shrunk from regional offices, including one in Vancouver, to one office in Quebec. Ten Coast Guard operations are being shut down. In BC alone, we are losing the search and rescue operation in Vancouver plus marine communication operations in Kitsilano, Comox and Tofino. The cuts affect the ability of the Coast Guard to monitor and deal with marine pollution offences. As well, the safety of mariners could be affected.

Further loss of capacity is found in the decision to reduce staff and budget to DFO’s Centre for Off-shore Oil, Gas, and Energy Research (COOGER), ending work in progress in many areas, including a “Baseline Hydrocarbon Study in Hecate Strait.” It was studying impacts of oil and gas leaks, counter-measures for an oil spill, restoration of environment after any spill, among other key areas.
Meanwhile, the entire marine mammal contaminants programme within DFO has been shut down. Nearly all of the DFO scientists studying marine toxicology across Canada are being laid off. Dr. Peter Ross, a globally respected scientist working at the Institute for Ocean Sciences in my riding, lamented, “The entire pollution file for the government of Canada, and marine environment in Canada’s three oceans, will be overseen by five junior biologists scattered across Canada – one of which will be in BC.” (quoted in Times Colonist, “Ottawa sinks pollution checks,” May 20, 2012)

The Joint Review Panel should take note of the fact that even when the programmes listed in points 10, 11, 12 and 13 were in operation, the Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable Development, within the Office of the Auditor General, concluded that Canada lacked the capacity to respond to an oil spill or other marine emergency.

These comments are not exhaustive, but represent substantial evidentiary hurdles on which the current proposal must fail.
Respectfully submitted,

Elizabeth E. May, O.C.
Member of Parliament
Saanich-Gulf Islands

[admin]

Coastal First Nations accuse Enbridge of underestimating oil spill risks

(Vancouver, September 21, 2012) - Coastal First Nations' lawyer Brenda Gaertner accused Enbridge of underestimating oil tanker spills on BC's coast.

Gaertner, of Mandell Pinder, asked Enbridge's "experts" at the Joint Review Panel hearing in Edmonton why they claim there would be only one tanker spill every 250 years. "Based on the US government's Oil Spill Risk Model there could be a tanker spill on average once every 6-12 years."

She also accused Enbridge of underestimating pipeline spills. Gaertner pointed to Enbridge's actual spill statistics records of an average of 60 spills per year. Based on this record, the Northern Gateway oil pipeline would have 46 pipeline spills every 4 years. "Enbridge's submission claims only 1 spill every 4 years. Enbridge has had an average of 60 spills per year from 1998 to 2010 and its rate of spills has shown no decline despite Enbridge's repeated commitment to reduce spills."

Gaertner challenged Enbridge's claim that the Northern Gateway will have fewer spills because it is a new pipeline. "Enbridge's own record shows that there has been no improvement in their spill record over the last 10 years and the new Keystone pipeline has already had a total of 12 spills since 2010."

Coastal First Nations executive director Art Sterritt said he's not surprised by Enbridge's flawed numbers. "Enbridge has consistently underestimated the risks and exaggerated the benefits of the proposed Northern Gateway Pipeline project."

Gaertner also accused Enbridge of over stating benefits by almost including benefits accruing to foreign owners as benefits to Canadians, contrary to federal government benefit cost guidelines. "Almost 50% of the oil and gas industry is foreign owned and the benefits to foreign shareholders should not be included as a Canadian benefit" said Gaertner.

Sterritt questions whether Enbridge's forecasts on the cost of oil spill are realistic. Enbridge claims that the total cost of all pipeline spills on the Northern Gateway to 2048 will be $22 million. "Enbridge just spent almost $800 million cleaning up one spill in Kalamazoo, Michigan and another $48 million cleaning up another spill in Illinois. The Kalamazoo spill alone is more than 35 times its estimate for all spills to 2048."

The Coastal First Nations also raised concerns that Enbridge has significantly underestimated greenhouse gas emission costs by using an estimate of $20 per tonne when Canada's Roundtable on the Environment and Economy estimates that the cost of reducing emissions is between $100 and $300 per tonne. Enbridge also excluded the greenhouse gas emissions from the production of oil transported on the pipeline and the increased production resulting from this pipeline

"Enbridge has continually exaggerated benefits while under estimating or not even reporting the environmental and social costs of this project. Misrepresenting the facts has robbed the Joint Review Panel of the opportunity to make an informed decision on the proposed Northern Gateway Project," Sterritt said.

The Coastal First Nations are an alliance of First Nations that includes the Wuikinuxv Nation, Heiltsuk, Kitasoo/Xaixais, Nuxalk, Gitga'at, Haisla, Metlakatla, Old Massett, Skidegate, and Council of the Haida Nation working together to create a sustainable economy on British Columbia's North and Central Coast and Haida Gwaii.

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For more information contact:

Art Sterritt

Executive Director, Coastal First Nations
604-868-9110

[admin]

Coastal First Nations pull out of this week's Northern Gateway Pipeline Joint Review Panel hearings

(Prince Rupert, BC) February 4, 2013 – Coastal First Nations can’t afford to participate in this week’s Joint Review Panel (JRP) on the proposed Northern Gateway Pipeline in Prince Rupert.

This is a David and Goliath scenario, said Art Sterritt. “It seems the only party that can afford this long and extended hearing process is Enbridge and, perhaps, the Federal Government. The average citizen can’t afford to be here and the Coastal First Nations cannot afford to be here.”

Sterritt, the executive director of the Coastal First Nations, said pulling out was a difficult decision because the Emergency Response Panel is dealing with important issues. “We planned to ask questions that included: does diluted bitumen sink; how quickly can a spill be responded to and how effective can cleanup be; how long will spilled oil remain in the ecosystem and what are the costs of a spill cleanup and who will pay.”

It is clear that more scientific study is needed on emergency preparedness, he said. “Despite the lack of information it is continuing with the process. Ultimately this means the JRP will not have the information it needs to make an informed recommendation and that in turn means the Federal Government will be making decisions not based on science.”

The funding disparity isn’t the only JRP issue the Coastal First Nations is unhappy with. “We are dismayed with the nature of the hearing process itself. Enbridge witnesses are not answering questions or their answers are self-serving and non-responsive. We see cross-examination answers by Enbridge witnesses which are crafted with, or provided by, other persons sitting behind these witnesses who cannot be cross-examined. This does not seem fair to us at all.”

We had agreed to participate in this process on the basis that the JRP was going to be a decision-maker on whether or not the project would go ahead. Then the Federal Government unilaterally changed the decision-making process, he said. “This was blatantly unfair and smacks of double dealing – something we as First Nation have become accustomed to with this government.”

Coastal First Nations will continue to monitor these proceedings and we will do what we can to participate given our limited resources, Sterritt said. “We are profoundly disappointed with the nature of this process. Taken together these problems undermine the legitimacy and authenticity of the hearing process, our pursuit of the true facts and, ultimately, a just result.”

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